


## Annex B: Supplementary contextual analyses

This document provides a number of more detailed, contextual analyses as additional background to the two key questions that will inform Gavi post-2020 Strategy:

1. How will the Alliance ensure continued progress on equitable coverage in the countries that are yet to transition?
2. How can the global community engage non-Gavi countries to address growing inequities and maximise the impact of their domestic investments in immunisation?
3. How will the Alliance ensure continued progress on equitable coverage in the countries that are yet to transition?




## Segmentation of countries builds on levels of immunisation barriers and C&E performance

Axes	Indicators	Associated thresholds	Assessment
Y <b>Immunisation barriers</b>	Vaccine mgmt. capacity (EVM)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High if &gt;= 80%</li> <li>Medium if &gt;= 60%</li> <li>Low if &lt; 60%</li> </ul>	High/ Medium/ Low <sup>1</sup>
	Institutional capacity (Gavi 4.0 SG3.4 indicator score)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High if &gt;= 3</li> <li>Medium if &gt;= 2</li> <li>Low if &lt; 2</li> </ul>	
	Gov. health spending (Health expenditure as % of GGE)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High if &gt;= 10%</li> <li>Medium if &gt;= 6%</li> <li>Low if &lt; 6%</li> </ul>	
	Workforce capacity (Nurses and midwives per 1000 pop.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High if &gt;= 3</li> <li>Medium if &gt;= 1</li> <li>Low if &lt; 1</li> </ul>	
	Data quality (A between survey and admin. source)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Low if &gt;= 20</li> <li>Medium if &gt;= 10</li> <li>High if &lt; 10</li> </ul>	
	Misuse of funds (Transparency index score)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High if &gt;= 40</li> <li>Medium if &gt;= 30</li> <li>Low if &lt; 30</li> </ul>	
	Demand generation (DTP1 – DTP3 Dropout Rate)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Low if &gt;= 10</li> <li>Medium if &gt;= 5</li> <li>High if &lt; 5</li> </ul>	
Widespread conflicts	Qualitative identification across WHO Grade 3, OCHA L3 emergencies and OECD extremely fragile states	Widespread Conflicts	
X <b>C&amp;E performance</b>	DTP3 coverage (WLEMC) <b>x2</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High if &gt;= 85%</li> <li>Medium if &gt;= 70%</li> <li>Low if &lt; 70%</li> </ul>	High/ Medium/ Low <sup>2</sup>
	Geographic equity (districts > 80% coverage)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High if &gt;= 90%</li> <li>Medium if &gt;= 70%</li> <li>Low if &lt; 70%</li> </ul>	
	Breadth of Protection (Gavi 4.0 SG Indicator)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High if &gt;= 60%</li> <li>Medium if &gt;= 35%</li> <li>Low if &lt; 35%</li> </ul>	


<sup>1</sup> Note: Indicator data for C&E pertains to 2017; for barriers pertains to 2016 except nurses/1000 population where last reported figures taken and health expenditures (2015)  
<sup>2</sup> 1. For each indicator a High = 3, Medium = 2 and Low = 1; if sum of all 7 indicators <= 11 then, Low and if = 17 then, High otherwise, Medium  
 2. For each indicator a High = 3, Medium = 2 and Low = 1 and x2 for DTP3 Coverage; if sum of all indicators <= 6 then, Low and if = 9 then, High otherwise, Medium

## Three segments across Gavi post-2020 countries with varying levels of performance and barriers



## Initial analysis shows progress in coverage in segment 1 while challenges in segments 2 & 3

### Segment-wise coverage trend 2011 / 2017 - DTP3 coverage



<sup>1</sup> Compounded Annual Growth Rate  
Source: WUENIC Immunization Coverage

## Targeted approaches for specific segments to be explored

### Key dimensions in Gavi's model and option space

*Illustrative*

<b>Objectives</b>	Capacity building / sustainability	Prioritise coverage gains
	Accelerate introductions	Ensure sustainability of existing vaccines
<b>Operating model</b>	Delivery through governments in country	Delivery through implementing partners
	'Light touch' fiduciary risk management	Dedicated resources to manage risks
	Retain co-financing model	Explore co-financing flexibilities (e.g. transition vaccines)
	Restrict campaigns	Opportunistic campaign approach

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## More deliberate focus on subnational approaches in large 'weak system' countries

### 2. Weak Systems

Weak systems with low C&E performance



Pakistan



Nigeria



Congo DRC



Ethiopia

### Examples of subnational approaches

- **Target setting** – systematic disaggregation of data and objectives by subnational levels
- **Channelling of funds** – directly to regional governments
- **Vaccine introductions** – Consider introduction of vaccines in parts of countries only
- **Subnational campaigns** – Ensure campaigns targeted to specific subnational regions
- **Subnational emergencies** – Unlock specific flexibilities and operating model
- **Direct engagement and advocacy** – at subnational levels with subnational government bodies



8

## Immunisation underpins PHC and provides a platform for UHC




- Immunisation has the **highest coverage rates** among key health interventions and **has to reach every household**
- Immunisation provides **touchpoints for a basic package of PHC interventions**
- As a preventive intervention, immunisation is one of the **best buys** in health, and therefore **essential in making PHC and UHC affordable**
- Immunisation helps remove **physical** and **financial barriers** to achieve Universal Health Coverage (UHC)

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## Accelerated vaccine coverage could bring the world closer to achieving the U5 mortality SDG target


Evolution of under-5 mortality (2000-2030)



<sup>12</sup> Note: Business as Usual: Normal conduct of business; Accelerated Coverage: Doubling down to improve vaccine coverage through targeted approaches to achieve nearly zero VPD deaths

## Gavi is a key contributor to outbreak detection, prevention and response

Gavi investments into epidemic VPD control (since 2016, \$M)




<sup>1</sup> Includes vaccine procurement (RI and campaigns), ops and VIGS for 2016-2018 period, PEF TCA and SFA for 2015-2018 period and HSS funds for 2016-2017. All amounts are approvals. <sup>2</sup> Surveillance is also indirectly contributing to prevent (by guiding vaccine introduction) and respond (by triggering outbreak response). <sup>3</sup> Programmatic envelope based on expenditure estimate for 2015-2016.

## Gavi engagement in GHS is critical as the risk of disease outbreaks continues to increase


### Successes in tackling some outbreaks

Smallpox cases (millions)



### However, new pathogens increasingly emerging...

New pathogen events



### ... going hand in hand with new risks for outbreaks

#### "New 21<sup>st</sup> century risks"

- Altered disease patterns, e.g., due to **climate change**
- Unprecedented **population density** incl. **urbanisation**
- **Globalisation** and **migration**

#### "Existing 20<sup>th</sup> century risks"

- Weak **primary healthcare**
- Low **detection** and **response** capacity
- **Others**

Source: WHO, Global trends in emerging infectious diseases – Nature (Revents approximated from published figures)

14

## In addition to mortality, outbreaks have a huge economic impact...

Select examples

#### Influenza (1918-1919) – Global:

- No cost estimate for 1918; at this scale today, would cost **4.8% of global GDP**

#### Influenza (1958) – Global:

- Estimated cost of **3.1% of global GDP**

#### Influenza (1968) – Global:

- Estimated cost of **0.7% of global GDP**

#### SARS (2003) – China and Hong Kong:

- Estimated cost of **0.001% of global GDP**

#### Ebola (2015) – Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea:

- Lost **0.003% of global GDP**

#### Zika (2015-2017) – Latin American & Caribbean region

- Lost **0.01% – 0.02% of global GDP**

**>\$6T**

Estimated cost of 21<sup>st</sup> century global pandemics


Source: Press research, Estimating the the global economic cost of SARS\* Jong-Wha Lee and Warwick J. McKibbin.

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## ... and are disruptive to health systems

Case study: Ebola outbreak, West Africa (2013-16)

- **>11k deaths due to Ebola itself**
- **881 cases & 513 deaths of health workers during the outbreak**
- **~11k additional deaths due to 50% reduction in access to healthcare services in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone**




16 1. Result of exacerbated malaria, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis mortality rates. Source: Effects of the West Africa Ebola Virus Disease on Health-Care Utilization – A Systematic Review, Kim J. Broin Ribacke

## Immunisation is particularly affected, leading to risks for additional vaccine-preventable deaths

Case study: Ebola outbreak in West Africa

Immunization coverage of children in Liberia, %



Reduction of measles immunisation coverage rate could have led to 12,000 additional deaths in case of a measles outbreak in West Africa (assuming a coverage drop of 75% for 18 months)


17 1 From routine immunisation data extracted from DHIS-2, covering 652 primary health care facilities  
2 Full immunisation defined as per WHO recommendation for children <1 year of age: Bacille Calmette-Guérin (BCG), polio, pentavalent, measles, yellow fever and pneumococcal

Source: Did the Ebola outbreak disrupt immunisation services? A case study from, Public Health Actions, C. S. Wessah, et al.




## Gavi Countries not well prepared to respond to potential outbreaks

### JEE assessment - overview



### Country breakdown




ReadyScore<sup>1</sup>: ■ Better prepared (> 80) ■ Work to do (>40-80) ■ Not ready (<=40) ■ Unknown ■ In progress

Source: [PreventEpidemiology.org](http://PreventEpidemiology.org) Oct 2015. 1. Across prevent, detect, respond and protect from other public health threats

18

## Funding gaps for responding to outbreaks remain after Ebola 2014

Case study: Zika outbreak 2016



Funds requested during 1<sup>st</sup> 6 months of the outbreak

1. Requested by WHO, PAHO (Pan American Health Organizations), WPRO (Western Pacific Regional Office), UNDP (U Program), UNFPA (UN Population Fund), UNICEF, UN Women, World Vision Source: WHO Zika Virus Outbreak Global report | May 2016

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## Overview of core pillars for outbreaks prevention/response

	JEE score	Prevent	Detect	Respond
1 Global legislation, coordination and advocacy	2.8 <sup>1</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Global / Regional advocacy</li> <li>Risk communication</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Global reporting of public health emergencies and outbreaks</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>International coordination of response &amp; communication</li> <li>Deployment of international teams in response to outbreak</li> </ul>
2 National coordination & communication	2.8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Public health risk mapping &amp; response plan</li> <li>National risk communication: on status, preventive measures, engagement with affected/ at risk communities, partner coordination</li> <li>Activation of emergency operations, Emergency Operations Centres, operating procedures and plans, points of entry management</li> </ul>		
3 Vaccines / Immunisation	4.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Routine immunisation</li> <li>Immunisation of specific groups (e.g. health workers)</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Epidemic-prone diseases vaccines development incentives</li> <li>Funding and deployment of stockpile vaccines</li> <li>Maintaining RI during outbreaks</li> </ul>
4 Diagnostic and surveillance	3.2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Development of predictive technology and diagnostic innovation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coordination of support for global and regional surveillance network</li> <li>National lab and surveillance capacity development</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Deployment of diagnostic mechanisms for rapid and correct detection during outbreaks</li> </ul>

20 <sup>1</sup> IHR legislation, coordination & communication score taken as a proxy for global legislation

## Broad landscape of international players coming together to tackle outbreaks









Non exhaustive



21

**1 Global legislation, coordination and advocacy**


## Various groups are supporting the International Health Regulations implementation

Prevent	Detect	Respond
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Coordination / management of global improvement on GHS agenda</b></li> </ul>		
 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>69 countries</li> <li>WHO, OIE, FAO, World Bank and 35 other international organisations</li> </ul>	 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>65 countries</li> <li>WHO, OIE, FAO, ECOWAS, UNISDR, EU</li> </ul>	 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>12 NGOS</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Definition of international standards / regulations</b></li> </ul>		
 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Obligations of countries to report any single case of 4 diseases and events involving epidemic-prone diseases of international concern</li> <li>States Parties are required to ensure that their national health surveillance and response capacities meet certain functional</li> </ul>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Global/ Regional advocacy</b></li> <li><b>Risk communication</b></li> </ul> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Global reporting of public health emergencies and outbreaks</b></li> </ul> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Deployment of international teams in response to outbreak</b></li> <li><b>International coordination of response &amp; communication</b></li> </ul>  

22

**2 National coordination and communication**

## National coordination & communication – Ebola 2018 outbreak example (1/2)



Democratic Republic of Congo – Ebola outbreak, 2018


**Outbreak timelines**

- 25<sup>th</sup> April 2018:** first confirmed case of Ebola in 2018 (although suspected cases emerged before)
- 8<sup>th</sup> May 2018:** an Ebola outbreak is declared in the Equateur province of the DRC (32 suspected cases, 18 deaths)
- 18<sup>th</sup> May 2018:** WHO calls an emergency meeting after a case of Ebola is confirmed in Mbandaka, a major city in the DRC (44 cases, 23 deaths)
- 21<sup>st</sup> May 2018:** launch of the vaccination intervention (maintained until 30<sup>th</sup> June 2018)
- As of 6<sup>th</sup> July 2018,** WHO has deployed 332 experts and the latest assessment concluded that the outbreak has largely been contained

**Donors Pledges<sup>1</sup>, USD millions**

World Bank	59.6
World Bank (PEF)	15.0
USAID	12.0
DFID	8.0
Germany	2.7
Wellcome	2.0
WHO CF	2.0
Africa CDC	2.0
CERF	1.0
Canada	1.0
Gavi	2.6
WHO response plan (26 USD millions)	2.6

**Cases and death number**



29 Deaths  
38 Confirmed cases  
15 Probable cases


No case to date

When political will of the international community is high, and in-country authorities are reactive and adequately coordinate the efforts, funding needs can be met rapidly and the outbreak contained

23 1 As of May 25<sup>th</sup>, 2018

2 National coordination and communication


## National coordination & communication – Ebola 2018 outbreak example (2/2)




**Outbreak response plan**

- Country rapidly reacted after the MoH has been alerted to suspected Ebola cases (investigation team deployed 2 days after notification)
- 1 USD million CFE unblocked on the very day the outbreak was declared
- Existence of a RT-PCR equipped lab in Kinshasa able to confirm cases (less than 4 days between sample collection and confirmation)
- In 25 days, DRC put together a comprehensive strategic response plan costing an exhaustive response strategy

**Main organisations involved in response**



**Country coordination**



Some time lost in agreeing protocol between WHO and MSF

Extra coordination efforts were required as many international actors were eager to be involved

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

4 Diagnostic/surveillance


## Surveillance contributes to GHS and the C&E agenda

Deep-dive in following


	Surveillance use case	Description	Examples	Implications on C&E
GHS-relevant use	<b>A</b> EPI quality assurance	Disease cases and outbreaks can indicate program gaps	Measles outbreaks despite declared high vaccine coverage	Identify C&E gaps in specific geographies and trigger action
	<b>B</b> Outbreak detection	Rapid detection of outbreaks key to rapid containment	Ebola outbreak scale as a function of detection date	Reduce routine immunisation disruption
Historic focus of Gavi investments	<b>C</b> Vaccine introduction decisions	Burden of disease data helps show if vaccine needed	Outbreak of AMR typhoid driving Pakistan introduction	Support efforts to build political will and target correct areas and groups
	<b>D</b> Vaccine effectiveness monitoring	Monitor changes in effectiveness, e.g., shifts in disease causing serogroups	Meningococcal serogroup monitoring showed need to change vaccine	Inform vaccine formulation choices to achieve effective protection

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


1. How can the global community engage non-Gavi countries to address growing inequities and maximise the impact of their domestic investments in immunisation?




## Nearly 60% of children dying of VPDs in 2020 will be in LMICs

Evolution of VPD mortality (2000-2030)




31 Note: World Bank 2017 country classification has been applied to the whole time series.

## Since the 70's the world has changed dramatically; outdated perceptions & models need to be challenged





Since the 70's the world has changed dramatically;  
outdated perceptions & models need to be challenged



People across the globe can be categorized  
into four income levels

**Vulnerable People**

Waiting for water  
Limited access to clean water  
No access to life-saving medicines  
Hunger and starvation

**\$ 40/ month, Burundi**

Buy slippers, cycle, plastic buckets  
1 or 2 children attend primary school  
Helpless against infections/diseases  
Able to afford staples

**\$ 254/ month, Bolivia**

Able to travel to Beijing  
Children attend high school  
Able to pay medical bills  
Access to fridge, stored food



**\$ 738/ month, China**

Car-owners, travel by plane  
Cold and hot water indoors  
Access to medical people, hospitals  
Eat out, go to movies


**\$ 2,194/ month, France**

34 Source: Gapminder.com - Dollar Street, Factfulness by Hans Rosling






## MICs host almost half of the world's refugees and IDPs



Note: An internally displaced person is someone who is forced to flee his or her home but who remains within his or her country's borders. Gavi-Eligible refers to Gavi 72 and Never-Gavi refers to countries not part of Gavi 72  
 37 Source: World Bank Databank 2016 for Refugees; UNHCR - Global Trends 2017 for IDPs

## Under-immunized in former and never Gavi MICs anticipated to grow to almost 70% by 2030

### Under-immunized children (DTP3) by income grouping



Note: Gavi Eligible includes countries eligible in 2017 and 2030 respectively; Former Gavi countries represent the remaining of Gavi-72 that transitioned; Gavi MICs exclude China, Bosnia, Albania, Ukraine & Turkmenistan that received Gavi support at some point, but did not undergo formal transition process; Nigeria 2030 forecast does not include expected improvement through Board-approved new transition plan; Syria assumed to become Gavi eligible in 2019  
 38 Source: WUENIC 2017 release - DTP3 Coverage

### ...despite significantly higher domestic expenditures on immunisation


Govt. expenditure on routine immunization per live birth (\$)



40 Note: Gavi-Eligible refers to Gavi 72 and Never-Gavi refers to countries not part of Gavi 72  
Source: JRF Routine Immunization Expenditures 2016


### Never-Gavi MICs lagging behind on PCV and Rota introductions...

Data as of 2018




39 Note: Gavi-Eligible refers to Gavi 72 and Never-Gavi refers to countries not part of Gavi 72  
Source: Vaccine Launch Database for Gavi-eligible countries; JHU/INAC View-Hub for PCV, Rota and PATH Global Overview for HPV for non-Gavi countries; Includes Phased/ Subnational and Regional introductions; Gavi Eligible excludes Syria

## Evolution of coverage rates shows worrying trends especially in never Gavi-eligible MICs



41 Note: Never Gavi refers to countries not part of Gavi 72. Former Gavi refers to Gavi 72 countries that will transition out by 2025  
Source: WUENIC 2017 release - DTP3 Coverage

## Relatively high and variable vaccines prices appear to be a driver of MICs underperformance



42 Source: VSP database - 2016 country reported data